TITOSLAVIA: 1948

BY

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PREFACE

1622-19

As an undergraduate student at Drake University, this writer became interested in two particular areas of European history. One was the study of southeastern Europe-- the Balkans, that strange junction of East and West which has assumed, in the last century, an importance so far out of proportion to its geographical extent or size of population. The second was the study of Communism, a politico-economic ideology which originated and developed in Europe, and which today threatens to engulf the world. This work was a logical consequence of these two interests.

The defection of Yugoslavia from the Communist bloc offered the writer a challenge. How had it come about? What were its causes? Although several books have appeared since 1950 which deal with the subject in a scholarly and informative manner, a comparison and re-evaluation were thought to have merit. Moreover, a study of this sort may offer to the non-technical American reader a useful presentation and analysis of a vital contemporary issue, for what happened in Yugoslavia was more than just an isolated Balkan episode; it was proof positive that the power politics and imperialism of twentieth century Communism is fundamentally no different from the power politics and imperialism of the past.

Because of the writer's lack of facility with Slavonic

languages, sources were of necessity limited. This handicap, however, was not as great as might be imagined, for many documents of value as original source material have been translated into English. Moreover, there is a wealth of secondary sources written by competent scholars, both American and European.

The writer wishes to extend his sincere appreciation to Dr. Frank Rosenthal who guided this thesis from its inception. His valuable suggestions and patient criticism made possible the completion of this paper. Thanks also should go to Dr. Charles J. Ritchey of the Department of History and to Miss Myrtle Beinhauer of the Graduate School of Drake University for their kind encouragement and understanding help.

The transliteration of Yugoslav names presents a difficult problem. The writer has followed as closely as possible the Library of Congress system of transliteration for Serbo-Croatian. This system, however, necessitates a special note of caution, for certain consonantal sounds are represented by affixing accent marks to other consonants which bear some resemblance to them. The following gives the approximate English pronunciation of accented consonants:

ć as the English tch in "witch."

č as the English ch in "church."

š as the English sh in "show."

ž as the English s in "pleasure."

To make matters even more confusing, "c" is pronounced as the English "ts" in "lets", and "j" as the "y" in "yet".

Unfortunately, even this method is far from foolproof,

and certain exceptions have been made. In quotations, of course, the spelling used in the quoted source has been followed. For words in common use, particularly geographic terms, the English spelling has been employed, e.g., Belgrade for Beograd and Yugoslavia for Jugoslavija. Also, the author has inserted an extra "s" in the word "Kosovo", making it "Kossovo", to avoid the English inclination to use a "long o" in the first syllable.

The confusion resulting from such a method is regrettable. However, if the examples above are followed, names can be pronounced intelligibly. Any attempt to deal with the quality of vowels or stress of syllables would be far beyond this writer's province.

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CHAPTER I

YUGOSLAVIA

The Land and the People

The Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia is one of the major political divisions of southeastern Europe. Located in the northwestern portion of the Balkan Peninsula, it is bounded by Austria, Hungary, and Rumania on the north; by Rumania and Bulgaria on the east; by Greece and Albania on the south; and by Albania, the Adriatic Sea, and Italy on the west. Nominally possessing a republican form of government, the country is composed of six constituent republics: Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzogovina, and Macedonia.

Yugoslavia has a total area of 98,896 square miles, encompassing a great diversity of natural environment. The towering Alps of Central Europe project into the northwest corner of the country; the Dinaric Alps border the coast; a rough barren karst region lies between the Dinaric Alps and the Adriatic coast;[1] the Balkan and Rhodope mountains of Bulgaria jut across the eastern border; in the north along the

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[1]V. C. Finch and G. T. Trewartha, Elements of Geography: Physical and Cultural (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1942), p. 281: "In regions of pure limestone especially, underground solution may remove rock to the extent that large caverns are formed or the rock honeycombed with small cavities, and the surface is dotted with depressions caused by solution cavities or by the collapse of cavern roofs. Such regions are said to have karst features, and in them a large part of the drainage flows in underground channels rather than in surface streams."

valleys of the Sava, Drava, Danube, and Tisa Rivers lies the broad and fertile Vojvodina Plain, a southern appendage of the Great Hungarian Plain; and along the basins of the Morava and the Vardar in the south lies another rugged and chaotic mountain region.

Three distinct climates are found in Yugoslavia. Along the Adriatic coast the climate is mild and sunny with warm winters and cool summers. The plains area and northern interior of the country lie within the central European climatic zone. It has hot, moist summers and cold, snowy winters. In the south, along the Vardar and Morava, a continental climate prevails with hot, dry summers and cold winters.

Geographic barriers have had a profound effect on the development of Yugoslavia. Since mountains and plateaus occupy approximately 75 percent of the land, transportation has never developed to an adequately efficient stage. The road system is poor, particularly in the eastern portion of the country, with very few hard surfaced, all-weather roads.

The railroad system is likewise poorly developed. Although the country has over 7,000 miles of railroads, they follow only the established routes.[1] Thus, there are railroad lines between all major cities, but connections between the coast and interior are poor as are those in the more remote sections of the country. Because of these rather poor facilities, the Yugoslavs are forced to rely heavily on their 1,300

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[1]Hugh Seton-Watson, "Yugoslavia," Britannica Book of the Year: 1954, p. 758: According to figures available in 1949, Yugoslavia had 7,113 miles of railroads.


AUSTRIA
HUNGARY
ITALY
ROMANIA
BULGARIA
ALBANIA
GREECE
ADRIATIC SEA
Ljubljana
Zagreb
Sava River
Drava River
Danube River
Tisa River
Novi Sad
Vrsac
Belgrade
Kostajnica
Brod
Sušak
Trieste
Una River
Banja Luka
Negotin
Loznica
Gospić
Kragujevac
Zadar
Sarajevo
Užice
Vrbas River
Drina River
Nis
Split
Mostar
Ibar River
Lim River
Novi Pazar
Dubrovnik
Tirana
Prizren
Skoplje
Vardar River
Debar
Bitolj
SLOVENIA
CROATIA
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA
SERBIA
MONTENEGRO
MACEDONIA
ADRIATIC SEA
The Federal Peoples Republic of
YUGOSLAVIA
SCALE OF MILES
25 50 75 100
National Capital ..... ⊙
Republic Capital ..... ★

miles of navigable rivers and streams.

The geographic barriers to development are further evident in the fact that the coastal mountains and the rugged and inhospitable karst region interposes a formidable barrier between the northern plains where most of the people live, and the coast, which would otherwise give easy access to the rest of the world. This region so hampers the development of seaports and the effective use of the Adriatic that, although a coastal country, Yugoslavia is a Danubian state, which in the north has traditionally been forced to keep in close touch with Hungary.

Moreover, the very geographical position of the country has proved to be a tragic circumstance for its people, for across the country lie four of the main invasion and migration corridors of southeastern Europe. At Belgrade three of these routes converge: the first, the land and waterway along the Danube Valley from the Vienna Gate to the Black Sea, connecting central with southeastern Europe and Europe with the Steppes and Asia Minor; the second, the corridor from the north Adriatic (Peartree Pass) along the Sava River to Belgrade; and the third, the north-south route from Belgrade through Niš and Skoplje along the valleys of the Vardar and Morava to Salonika. The fourth of these great corridors is actually a branch of the north-south route. It runs from Niš in the Morava Valley through Sofia and Adrianople to Istanbul.

Being thus situated, Yugoslavia has experienced a history of foreign invasions. From early Greece to the twentieth century the great powers of Eastern Europe have vied for her

strategic avenues, seriously hindering united political development.[1] Moreover, each invasion and each migration of peoples has left in its wake straggling remnants of its horde, thus effecting a profound influence upon the culture and ethnography of the modern state.

Despite all these geographical disadvantages, Yugoslavia has rather promising potentialities. Nearly one-third of the area of the country is covered with forests, making her an important producer of timber and wood pulp. Futhermore, the country is the chief source of minerals in southeastern Europe. The principal minerals include copper, iron, coal and lignites, bauxite, lead, zinc, gold, antimony, chrome ore, and salt. Under the present government's planned economy, all these resources, as well as the hydro-electric potential of the country, are being developed to the fullest possible extent.

Yugoslavia's lack of ethnographic unity is evident in the original name of the country, the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. It is even more evident, however, when

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[1] Ljubiša Stojković and Miloš Martić, National Minorities in Yugoslavia (Belgrade: Publishing and Editing Enterprise "Jugoslavija," 1952), p. 5: "Yugoslav history has been full of continuous wars and struggles for survival, freedom and independence. Many conquerors have been assaulting this part of Europe, which, though not large in size, is of prime economic and strategic importance. The ancient Greeks, the Avars, Goths, Visigoths, Sarmatians, Gepids, Gerulians, Huns, Byzantines, Magyars, Tartars, Turks, Crusads, Germans and Italians have all sought conquest through war in Yugoslav territory. For centuries waves of conquerors swept over the Yugoslav lands, succeeding one another, pursuing their policy of plunder and annihilation of people in various ways. Under their onslaughts the populations of entire regions had to abandon their hearths."

it is considered that these three peoples account for only 75 percent of the country's population. At the time of the 1948 census, the total population of the country was 15,772,107.[1] This amazing ethnic medley included six constituent plurality groups:

Serbs	6,547,190
Croats	3,784,969
Slovenians	1,415,214
Macedonians	809,613
Montenegrins	425,679
nationally undeclared Moslems	808,904[2]

In addition, the 1948 census recorded the presence of fifteen national minorities. These minority peoples included:

Shquiptars (Albanians)	750,483
Hungarians	496,493
Walachs	102,957
Turks	98,001
Slovaks	83,624

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[1]Seton-Watson, op. cit., p. 557: For the six Yugoslav people's republics the 1948 census figures were: Serbia, 6,527,969; Croatia, 3,756,807; Slovenia, 1,391,873; Bosnia-Herzegovina, 2,565,283; Macedonia, 1,152,986; and Montenegro, 377,189. These six people's republics are primarily historical and political units; they serve only to a limited extent as ethnic or national divisions.

[2]Yugoslav Federal Statistical Office, Provisional Results of the Population Census, Statistical Bulletin, No. 1 (July, 1950), pp. 16-17, cited by Ljubiša Stojković and Miloš Martić, National Minorities in Yugoslavia (Belgrade: Publishing and Editing Enterprise "Jugoslavija," 1952), p. 31.

Italians	79,573
Gipsies	72,671
Bulgarians	61,140
Czechs	39,014
Russenes (Ruthenians and Ukrainians)	37,168
Russians	20,065
Germans	55,328
Rumanians	64,092
Jews	6,861
Greeks	1,897[1]

Religious divisions, though fewer numerically, are hardly less divergent. Of the sixteen million inhabitants of Yugoslavia, forty-eight percent are Serbian Orthodox, thirty-five percent are Roman Catholic, eleven percent are Mohammedan, and the remaining six percent are Jewish or of various Protestant denominations.[2]

The population density of Yugoslavia is over 170 persons per square mile.[3] However, the fact that only about 30 percent of the land is arable, coupled with the extreme primitiveness of cultivation, makes Yugoslavia overpopulated.[4]

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[1] Ibid., p. 31-32.

[2] Letter from Mladen Soich, Deputy Director, Yugoslav Information Center (New York), February 9, 1953.

[3] This figure is based on the preliminary results of the 1953 population census of 16,250,000 cited by Seton-Watson, op. cit., p. 557. For comparison, France has 199 per sq. mile, Czechoslovakia 250, Denmark 262.

[4] Alex N. Dragnich, "Social Structure," Yugoslavia, ed. by Robert J. Kerner (Berkley: University of California Press, 1949), p. 223: "[There are] nearly twice as many persons to the square kilometer of arable land in Yugoslavia as in western European countries . . . ."

Moreover, Yugoslavia is said to rank first among European nations in net growth of population.[1]

Yugoslavia is now and always has been a predominantly rural society. Prior to World War II three-quarters of its population was directly dependent on agriculture and forestry.[2] The census of 1948 would indicate that a smaller number was so dependent, probably about 65 percent.[3] Much of this decrease was no doubt due to the immediate post war industrial expansion under the various Communist economic plans, and according to the Yugoslav government, this trend is still continuing.[4]

The educational level of the Yugoslav population is very low. When the country was established following World War I, only about 55 percent of the nation could read and write.[5] In 1918 the government organized a free compulsory educational system. Under the direct control of the central

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Royal Institute of International Affairs, Information Department, South-Eastern Europe: A Political and Economic Survey (London: Oxford University Press, 1939), p. 141.

[3] Because of the manner in which the census of 1948 is broken down, it is difficult to arrive at an accurate figure. For example, those individuals who derive their income from agriculture outside of farm cooperatives are listed under the heading "Private Individuals," along with certain persons engaged in trade. Thus, it is impossible to tell from available figures exactly how many people are actually engaged in agriculture.

[4] Letter from M. Soich, op. cit.

[5] Severin K. Turosienski, "Education," Yugoslavia, p. 230: "In the southern districts, where the Turks ruled longest, only 27-37 percent of those over ten years of age could read and write. By way of comparison, in the Slovene districts, where the somewhat more enlightened Austrian rule had permitted education at a much earlier date, more than 94 percent were liter-

government, the schools served as excellent voices of Yugoslav nationalism, but did little to alleviate the enormous problem of illiteracy. Just prior to World War II, 40 percent of the Yugoslavs remained illiterate; after twenty years of effort the proportion of illiteracy had been reduced only 5 percent.[1]

Post World War II Yugoslavia seems to have made a genuine attempt to eliminate illiteracy. New schools have been established, many of them teaching in minority languages.[2] There have been several drives attempting to decrease illiteracy among adults. With a well-organized educational system, extending into every corner of the country and reaching every lingual group; this tremendous barrier to progress might soon be overcome.

History

Politically, Yugoslavia is a new country, although its

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ate. But in spite of the higher degree of literacy in the north, only 54.8 percent of the nation as a whole could read and write. Among women this proportion was only 43 percent, though men made a better showing (67.3 percent)."

[1] Ibid., p. 243. Turosienski further states: "Though the situation is admittedly bad in Yugoslavia, it must be remembered that much of this illiteracy was present in the adult population. After the First World War, education reached a larger proportion of the younger generation. With the reestablishment of Yugoslavia and the reapplication of cumpulsory education there is good reason to believe that the time will soon come when Yugoslavia may boast of a well-educated population with a fruitful culture of its own."

[2] See Stojković and Martić, op. cit., chap. VIII.

history goes back to the sixth century of the Christian era when the various tribes of South Slavs migrated from the plains of southern Russia and settled in the valleys of the central Balkans.[1]

When the Slavs entered the Balkans, they came not as nations but as loosely organized tribes. The Slovenes settled in the northern portion of the west Balkan region, the Croats in the center, and the Serbs in the south.[2] As tribal power was consolidated, nation states emerged. By the middle of the fourteenth century the Serbs, under Tsar Stephen Dušan, had developed a large and powerful empire stretching well beyond the Serbian ethnic borders.[3] Then came the turning

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[1]Stoyan Pribichevich, World Without End: The Saga of Southeastern Europe (New York: Reynal Hitchcock, 1939), pp. 17 ff: About 2,000 B. C. a group of people known broadly as Illyrs moved down from the north and settled in the northwestern section of the Balkan Peninsula, including nearly all of the territory of present day Yugoslavia. Although primarily an agricultural people, the Illyrs were fierce warriors, well known and respected by the Greeks to the south.

After the Roman conquest of the Balkans, the Illyrs offered their military services to Rome, and in the third century A. D. their power had reached such an extent that they had gained command of the Roman Army. Since the Roman Legions were the source of Imperial power, this meant command of the Roman Empire. Several Emperors of that period-- among them Cladius the Goth, Aurelian, and Diocletion-- were Illyrs.

With the disentegration of the empire and the invasions from the east by the Visigoths and Huns, the power and influence of the Illyrs were completely destroyed.

[2]Robert J. Kerner, "The Yugoslav Movement," Yugoslavia, op. cit., p. 33.

[3]Ferdinand Schevill, The History of the Balkan Peninsula From the Earliest Times to the Present Day, rev. ed. with the collaboration of Wesley M. Gewehr (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1933), pp. 152 ff.

point in Balkan history, the invasion by the Ottoman Turks.

The Turks acquired their first European possession in 1354 and immediately began to expand their empire. The Byzantine Empire and Bulgaria bowed before the Ottoman might, and the Turks swept westward into Serbia. After a series of minor combats the Serbs and Turks came face to face for final battle. "In the great interior plain of Kossovo, set like an amphitheater among the Macedonian mountains, on June 28, 1389, the hosts of Cross and Crescent met to decide the fate of the peninsula."[1] The outcome was decisive. The Serbs were defeated and Balkania lay prostrate at the feet of the conquerors.

The Battle of Kossovo marked the beginning of centuries of bondage for the Serbs. In the years that followed the Serbs revolted many times, but generally these revolts were disunited and ineffective. The first concerted uprising took place in 1804 under the leadership of the Serbian hero Karageorge (Karadjordje). In 1815 another uprising under Miloš Obrenović obtained limited concessions from the Turks. In the period 1830 to 1834, and due to persistent Russian pressure, Turkey made various concessions, by virtue of which Serbia became an autonomous state with the rebel Miloš as hereditary prince.[2] It was not, however, until the Congress of Berlin in 1878 that long struggling Serbia gained full and complete independence.[3]

Just west of Serbia are two historic provinces known

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[1] Ibid., p. 187. [2] Ibid., p. 323. [3] Ibid., pp. 404 f.

as Bosnia and Herzogovina. Both have predominantly Serb population. Exposed equally to military conquest by Serbia to the east and Hungary-Croatia to the north, they somehow managed to lead a more or less independent existence under rulers of their own.

Religious schism plays an important part in the history of these provinces. For centuries this region had been a battleground of religious persuasion between the Latin and Greek churches.[1] Ironically, the inhabitants had, in large numbers, turned their backs on both faiths and accepted Bogomilism.[2]

After the Turkish conquest of Bosnia-Herzogovina in the fifteenth century, many Serbian nobles adopted the Moslem faith in order to retain their land and feudal privileges. Thus, in the years that followed, a great many native Serbians of Bosnia-Herzogovina accepted the religion of their conquerors.[3]

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[1] Ibid., pp. 404 f.

[2] Ibid., pp. 164 f: Bogomilism made its first appearance in the Balkans during the tenth century under the auspices of a Bulgar priest named Bogomil, from whom the religion derived its name. The faith spread from Bulgaria to Serbia, where it was suppressed, and then into Bosnia, where it received broad popular support. In the fifteenth century, a Bosnian King openly avowed himself a Bogomil, thus taking a stand with the majority of his people.

Bogomilism is, in point of doctrine, more or less identical with other heretical sects, such as the Cathari, Patarenes, and Albigenes, which disquieted the Latin West for many centuries. In sum, Bogomilism in form if not in name, traveled beyond Balkania and became the most general of all medieval heresies, protesting, wherever found, against the "ritualistic forms and aristocratic organization of the Christian Church."

[3] Matthew Spinka, "Modern Ecclesiastical Development,"

The Congress of Berlin granted the Austro-Hungarian Empire the right of occupation and administration of Bosnia-Herzogovina, although technically it was still a Turkish territory. In 1908 the Dual Monarchy formally annexed the two provinces, and they remained under Austro-Hungarian rule until the end of World War I.

It was in Bosnia that the incident occurred that precipitated World War I. On June 28, 1914, the anniversary of the Battle of Kossovo, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the heir to the Austrian throne, entered the Bosnian capital, Sarajevo, and was assassinated by Gavrilo Princip, a young Serbian revolutionary. Thus, at a tremendous cost to themselves and to the world, the Bosnians gained their freedom.

One of the most primitive areas of Yugoslavia is the former independent Kingdom of Montenegro, or by its local name Crna Gora, the Black Mountain. Inhabited by Serbs, Montenegro was part of the flourishing twelfth century Serbian Empire. After 1389 and the disastrous defeat at Kossovo, large numbers of Serbs fled before the advancing Turks and took refuge in its rugged mountain regions. Many times in the following centuries Turkish armies tried to conquer this tiny country. Though the Turks never succeeded, it is possible that for a time some sort of submission was made and a slight

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Yugoslavia, p. 260.

Schevill, op. cit., p. 164 states: "When shortly after the middle of [the fifteenth century], the Turks conquered Bosnia, the Bosnian Bogumils in large numbers and apparently without the need of much persuasion went over to Mohammedanism, the simple practices of which were more congenial to them than the elaborate ritual of the Orthodox Church."

tribute paid to the Sultan.[1] In 1799 a treaty was concluded between Turkey and Montenegro in which the Turks recognized, without reservation, the full independence of the kingdom.[2]

To the north of the Serbs are found their South Slav brothers, the Slovenes and the Croats. The Slovenes are the smallest and the weakest member of the South Slav family.[3] At some time early in their history they occupied a much larger territory, penetrating far into Austria, but Charles the Great and his successors drove them back to the site of their present home at the northeast corner of the Adriatic.[4] The Slovenes never had an independent state of their own, having come under Habsburg rule in the Middle Ages. In 1809 they were incorporated into Napoleon's short-lived Illyrian Provinces but were returned to Austria by the Congress of Vienna, 1814-1815, and ruled by them until 1918.

Along the broad valley of the Sava River lies Croatia. The Croats were the first of the South Slavs to form a powerful government, having their own king in the tenth century. In 1102 Croatia became associated with Hungary as a "separate and independent political entity."[5] After the Hungarian defeat at the Battle of Mohacs in 1526, most of Croatia fell to the Turks, and that which was left came under Habsburg control.

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[1]See Schevill, op. cit., pp. 311 ff.

[2]Ibid., p. 316.

[3]Kerner, op. cit., p. 34.

[4]Hugh Seton-Watson, The East European Revolution (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1951), p. 3.

[5]Kerner, op. cit., p. 34.

By 1687 Croatia was once more under Hungarian rule, which continued until 1918.

The Croats, like the Slovenes, do not regard themselves as a Balkan people, but as Central Europeans, as perhaps they are. Both of these peoples accepted Christianity from Rome, and until 1918 were linked politically and culturally with central Europe. This religious and cultural cleavage was to pose serious problems in fledgling Yugoslavia.

North of Albania, extending over two hundred miles along the eastern shores of the Adriatic Sea, is a long narrow strip of land known as Dalmatia. Part of the tenth century Croat state and inhabited primarily by Croats, Dalmatia served both Turkish and Venetian masters. In 1797 Napoleon gave Dalmatia to Austria, only to seize it for himself eight years later and transfer it to his new Kingdom of Italy. From 1809 to 1814 it formed part of the ill-fated Illyrian Provinces, and from the Congress of Vienna until the end of World War I, it was ruled by Austria.

The ideal, or idea, of Yugoslav unity developed as part of the frustrated nationalism directed at the ruling Italian, German, Magyar, and Turk. Napoleon's creation of the Illyrian Provinces in 1809 brought the Croats and Slovenes under united political rule for the first time. Although the Illyrian Provinces were short-lived, "Illyrianism" became a Croat ideal.[1]

In the first half of the nineteenth century Serbia, encouraged by Ottoman concessions, developed the supra-

[1] Ibid., pp. 35 ff.

national and imperialistic concept of a "Greater Serbia." When in the course of European political vicissitudes Serb and Croat were drawn closer and closer together, any movement directed toward a "Greater Croatia" or a "Greater Serbia" was, ostensibly at least, relegated to a more basic and fundamental pan-Slav ideal, Yugoslavism.

The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was proclaimed on December 1, 1918,[1] fulfilling the provisions of the Pact of Corfu.[2] From the very formation of this new state until World War II, Yugoslav politics were "enmeshed in a tangle of regional nationalisms, antagonistic creeds, and contrasting cultures, while being faced at the same time with exasperating economic and international problems."[3]

The most apparent of these internal differences and the crux of Yugoslavia's political difficulties was the conflict between her two largest ethnic groups. The Serbs, still dreaming of a "Greater Serbia," exhorted centralization; the

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[1]The name was officially changed to Yugoslavia on October 3, 1929.

[2]John Clinton Adams, "Serbia in the First World War," Yugoslavia, op. cit., pp. 88-89: "Conferences between the Serbian Cabinet and the leaders of the Yugoslav Committee resulted in the Pact of Corfu, signed on July 20, 1917. . . . This document affirmed the unity of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes and declared that all branches of the South Slavic race, including Montenegro, should form a single kingdom, on a constitutional and democratic basis, under the Karageorgević dynasty. Local autonomies, delimited by 'natural, social, and economic conditions,' would be provided for in the constitution of the kingdom."

[3]Joseph S. Roucek, Balkan Politics: International Relations in No Man's Land (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1948), p. 88.

Croats, fewer in number, advocated federalism.[1] This conflict reached a climax in 1928, when, in the parliamentary chambers, Puniša Račić, a Serb Deputy shot and killed the leader of the Croatian Peasants' Party, Stjepan Radić, and two of his colleagues, and wounded two others. This shocking incident and the alarming domestic situation led to the establishment of King Alexander's dictatorship. A dictatorship which was to last, in modified form, until World War II.[2] "All in all, self-determination is an unfortunate formula for southeastern Europe. Mutual tolerance would be a better one."[3]

The continued maneuvering for political position by these "old factions in new gowns" and the emphasis on regional orientation instead of national problems seriously burdened the fledgling government which, consequently, experienced a continuous series of cabinet crises.[4] Roucek, discussing the cabinet crises during Yugoslavia's first decade, states:

> The turnover amounted to 130 cabinet posts. Ten cabinets lasted only a few months each; no more than two succeeded in remaining in office for the record of eleven months. Other governments were in office for only one month, and even two weeks.[5]

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[1] Ibid., p. 87.
Cf. Bernard Newman, Balkan Background (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1945), pp. 190-191. The author, in discussing the Yugoslav political dilemma, remarks: "The Croats made the surprising discovery that they were outnumbered-- there were six million Serbs and only three million Croats and Slovenes. Thus, the Serbs could always outvote the Croats and Slovenes. One would have imagined that this might have been foreseen! Further, by a weird electoral law typical of the Balkans, a party which polled one-half of the total votes received 75 percent of the seats."

[2] Roucek, op. cit., p. 88.

[3] Pribichevich, op. cit., p. 176.

[4] Roucek, op. cit., p. 97.

[5] Ibid.

In 1934 King Alexander was assassinated, a fate not uncommon among Balkan politicians. The new King of the Yugoslavs was Peter II, a child of eleven; the regency was headed by Prince Paul Karageorgević. Under Paul, the dictatorship was continued, but in a more moderate form. And to the north a dictatorship of yet another degree was taking shape in Germany.

At the outset of World War II, Yugoslavia was in an extremely unenviable position. Destruction of the Little Entente, of which she was a member, was an important aim of German foreign policy.[1] Italy, a traditional rival, was determined to encircle Yugoslavia to prevent any threat to Italian Adriatic supremacy. "Disruption from within and dismemberment from outside seemed to be the purpose behind Italian policy to Yugoslavia."[2] Hungary, Bulgaria, and Albania had territorial claims and were anxious for her dismemberment, and her railways were essential for a successful attack on Greece.

Moreover, Germany had an economic stranglehold on Yugoslavia. In 1938 the German share in Yugoslav exports was 42 percent and in imports over 39 percent.[3] This situation became worse when Italy entered the war and, with the invasion of Albania, effectively cut off the Adriatic coast from the Allies.

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[1]Seton-Watson, East European Revolution, p. 51

[2]Ibid.

[3]Jozo Tomasevich, "Foreign Economic Relations, 1918-1941," Yugoslavia, op. cit., p. 212.

Prince Paul's government was desperately afraid of Germany. At the same time, any determination it might have had to resist Nazi demands was weakened by Nazi and Communist propaganda activities. When, in March 1941, Hitler demanded that Yugoslavia join the Tripartite Pact, thus freeing Germany's right flank in preparation for the attack on Russia, Prince Paul acquiesced.[1]

On March 25, 1941, Yugoslavia signed the Tripartite Pact. Popular reaction was immediate. A revolt led by the Serbian element of the army and supported by the Patriarch overthrew the government. The Regent and governmental officials were placed in custody, and seventeen-year-old King Peter II assumed full royal powers.

Thus, on March 27, 1941, "the Yugoslav nation found its soul."[2]

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[1]Roucek, op. cit., p. 106.

[2]Winston S. Churchill, in a speech to the Conservative Central Council, March 27, 1941, quoted by Mr. Churchill, The Grand Alliance (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1950), p. 168.

CHAPTER II

JOSIP BROZ-- YUGOSLAV AND COMMUNIST

In 1937 one Josip Broz, then known to his fellow Communists as "Comrade Walter," was summoned to Moscow and told of his appointment as the new Secretary-General of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (C.P.Y.). Since that day he has been the guiding hand of the C.P.Y. Under the name Tito, another party alias, Broz has led Yugoslav Communism through the gamut of revolutionary political expression, first, as a rigidly suppressed underground movement, second, as a resistance movement of heroic proportions directed against Axis domination, third, as the most exemplary of the Soviet Satellites, and finally, as the first successful manifestation of Communist nationalism outside of the U.S.S.R.

Thus, in a remarkably short time Josip Broz-Tito meteored from complete obscurity to a position of international prominence. Fitzroy Maclean, who headed the British military mission to Tito during World War II, states that as late as 1943, British intelligence officers were arguing "whether Tito existed at all, and, if so, whether he was a woman or a committee."[1] But only five years later, in 1948, this same man was to amaze the world by openly defying his fellow communists and coolly challenging the position of the Communist behemoth, the Soviet Union. His very name had become a political byword in the great ideological battle sweeping the world.

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[1]Fitzroy Maclean, Eastern Approaches (London: Cape, 1949), p. 389, quoted in Leigh White, Balkan Caesar: Tito Versus Stalin (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1951), p. 13.

Tito was born Josip Broz in the Croatian village of Kumrovec, May 25, 1892. His father, Franjo Broz, was a Croat; his mother Marija Javeršek, a Slovene. Tito lived the typical frugal youth of a Croat peasant and received little education. At the age fifteen he was apprenticed to a locksmith in Sisak, and while there developed his first interest in the Socialist movement. Three years later, upon the completion of his apprenticeship, he joined the Metal Workers' Union and the Social-Democratic Party of Croatia and Slavonia. In Tito's words, "It was one of the proudest mements of my life."[1]

For young Broz 1910 to 1913 were wanderjahre. He travelled over Europe, Trieste, Vienna, Munich, Pilsen, the Ruhr, working at various jobs. In 1913 he entered the Austro-Hungarian army for two years of compulsory military service. Shortly after the outbreak of World War I, Tito's regiment was sent to the Carpathians to halt the Russian advance in that sector. "According to some sources, Tito promptly deserted to the Russians; according to others, he was captured during a Russian attack, in the course of which he was seriously wounded."[2] In either event, he became a Russian prisoner of war.

In 1917 Tito escaped from his captors and made his way to the Russian capital, St. Petersburg, where he took part in the July Demonstrations against the provisional government.[3]

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[1]Vladimir Dekijer, Tito (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1952) p. 25.

[2]White, op. cit., p. 17. Dedijer, op. cit., pp. 34-35, cites Tito as saying that he was wounded by a Circassian lancer and captured.

[3]Dedijer, op. cit., p. 38.

He joined the Red International Guard, composed of prisoners of war, at the time of the October Revolution, but he did not see any action.[1]

In 1920 Tito returned to his native Croatia, now part of newly formed Yugoslavia. The same year he joined the Communist Party, thus beginning a conspiratorial existence that was to last until after World War II.

The year 1920 was a signal one for Yugoslav Communists. The C.P.Y. had not come into being until after World War I, and then was "little more than a revolutionary expression of and aspiration for socialism and radicalism"[2] It found, however, a responsive segment of the population among Yugoslavia's discontented minorities. Following the 1920 elections to the Constituent Assembly, the Communists emerged as the third strongest party in that body, obtaining fifty-eight of the 419 seats.[3]

The communists' popularity was to be short-lived, however. In 1921 the party was outlawed following a series of terroristic acts against the government, including the attempted

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[1] Ibid., p. 39.

[2] Adam B. Ulam, Titoism and the Cominform (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), p. 3.

[3] Ibid., p. 8: "Characteristically, it won its greatest successes in two disaffected and most backward regions: in Montenegro it won 40 percent and in Macedonia 33 percent of the seats in the Constituent Assembly. . . . In Croatia and Slovenia, the two most advanced and industrialized provinces where the national problem was also important, the Communists did, paradoxically, very poorly. Slovenia and Croatia are of course Catholic, and in Croatia the nationalist aspiration was well represented by Radich's party."

assassination of Prince Regent Paul and Premier Pašić and the murder of Minister of the Interior Draškovic. Thus, the C.P.Y. temporarily ceased to be a major force in Yugoslav politics.[1]

After the Party was outlawed, it led a clandestine existence. Tito moved from job to job, organizing trade union branches and Communist cells. Finally, he was made secretary of the Metal Workers' Union, so that he could devote more time to Party labors.

Between 1926 and 1928 the C.P.Y. was torn with factional strife. In 1928 the Zagreb branch of the Party, led by Tito, went over the heads of their superiors and appealed directly to the Comintern to end the factionalism and take the Yugoslav component in hand.

> It is likely that the Zagreb conference of 1928 and its letter created a good impression in Moscow and drew its attention to the promising young Croat Communist, who instead of being 'left' or 'right' wanted simply to receive marching orders from the Comintern.[2]

At the Fourth Congress of the C.P.Y., held later that year in Dresden, Germany, the Comintern did, in fact, take the Party in hand. The Yugoslav Communists were severely taken to task by the delegate of the Third International, Comrade "Ercoli," and new leadership for the C.P.Y. was nominated, headed by Djuro Djakovic, and including Josip Broz. "Ercoli," now better known as Palmiro Togliatti, Secretary-General of the

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[1]Tito, Political Report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, Delivered at the Fifth Congress of the C.P.Y. (Belgrade, 1948), p. 25, cited by Ibid., p. 9: In 1923, the Independent Workers' Party of Yugoslavia, a Communist "front," could muster only 18,000 votes-- a loss of more than 90 percent of the Communists' previous showing at the polls.

[2]Ulam, op. cit., p. 14

Italian Communist Party, called for complete and absolute submission to the Third International.[1] "The Party functionaries returned from Dresden more as Soviet agents than as Yugoslav Communists."[2]

Unfortunately for Tito, he was not able to enjoy his new position for long. He was arrested in August, 1928, for his conspiratorial and subversive activities, and sentenced to five years in prison at hard labor.

Tito was first sent to Lepoglava, Croatia. There he met Mosa Pijade, his future partisan comrade and political advisor. Discipline at Lepoglava was, to all appearances, notoriously lax. Tito and Pijade not only organized a Party cell within the prison walls, but set up a course of study and lectures for the prisoners.[3] Pijade even translated Das Kapital into Serbo-Croat.[4] Ultimately, Tito was accused of conspiring to escape and was transferred to Maribor, Slovenia "the worst prison in Yugoslavia."[5]

Upon his release from prison in 1934, Tito once more devoted himself to Party activities. By law he was required to remain in his native village of Kumrovec and report daily to the appropriate authorities. He left the village, however, and a warrent was issued for his arrest. Tito dyed his hair, grew a mustache, assumed aliases, and successfully eluded the police.

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[1] Ibid., pp. 15 ff. [2] Ibid., p. 18.

[3] Josip Broz Tito, assisted by Vladimir Dedijer, "Tito Speaks," Life, 32 (April 28, 1952), 67.

[4] Ibid., fn. [5] Ibid., p. 67.

During Tito's imprisonment the Party's fortunes had hardly improved. After the establishment of King Alexander's dictatorship in 1929, a new wave of Communist repression swept the country. Djaković had died in jail, allegedly after having been tortured by police.[1] The remaining leaders fled the country and headquartered in Vienna.

Tito endeavored to reestablish strong party leadership and, because of his efforts, he became increasingly more prominent in the Party organization. In December 1934, he was elected to the Central Committee of the C.P.Y., and the next month he was nominated for membership in the Balkan Secretariat of the Comintern. When accepted, he left immediately for Moscow.

Tito stayed in Moscow until 1936, as a member of the Balkan Secretariat and rapporteur for Yugoslavia. He also delivered lectures on trade union matters at the International Leninist School and at the Communist University of the National Minorities in the West (KUNMZ). Ultimately, he was sent back to Yugoslavia to head the Party organization within the country. Gorkić, the Secretary-General of the C.P.Y., went to Paris to set up new Central Committee headquarters.

On leaving Russia, Tito was also given the task of organizing and mobilizing Yugoslav volunteers for the Spanish Civil War. He apparently did a creditable job, for the Yugoslavs were the most numerous of the Balkan volunteers.[2]

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[1]Ulam, op. cit., p. 18.

[2]White, op. cit., p. 23.

> About one thousand five hundred Yugoslavs, including many intellectuals, were sent. The losses suffered by the Yugoslavs in Spain were extremely heavy: Almost half of them were killed, three hundred were wounded, and three hundred and fifty interned in concentration camps near the French frontier after the collapse of Spain. Of these, about three hundred managed to escape and get to Yugoslavia, where they later fought in the war.[1]

It was these veterans of the Spanish Civil War that provided the cadres for Tito's Partisans. Indeed, so many of them continue to hold high office in Yugoslavia's military and government, that they have become known in Belgrade as the "Spanish nobility."[2]

By 1937 the internal difficulties of the C.P.Y. had become so pronounced that the Soviet Union, in the official guise of the Comintern, decided to end the factionalism once and for all. The entire leadership of the C.P.Y., with one exception, was purged. The one exception was Josip Broz, or "Comrade Walter," who was designated Secretary-General of the Party. In 1939 it was announced that a number of the former leaders, including Gorkić, Sima Marković, Anton Mavrak, Jovan Martinović, and Djuro Cvijić, had been excluded from the Party.[3] The last vestiges of pre-Stalinist Communism were rapidly disappearing; the Party was rapidly becoming one of young men.

Adam Ulam states:

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[1]Dedijer, op. cit., p. 113

[2]White, op. cit., p. 24

[3]Alexander Rankovic, Report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia on the Organizational Work of the C.P.Y., presented at the Fifth Congress of the C.P.Y. (Belgrade, 1948), p. 5, cited by Ulam, op. cit., p. 23.

> He [Tito] had literally to step over the bodies of many of his predecessors, in full knowledge that the political life-span of the leader of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia was, as a rule, very short and unpleasant. His predecessors had either been liquidated or had led a wretched existence, abused at every occasion, intermittently thrown out of then readmitted into the Party, and yet in many cases unable to divorce themselves completely from what had been their entire life. Had he not been a Communist fanatic in 1937, Tito could not have helped knowing that any major shift in the policy of the Comintern or the liquidation of one of his Russian protectors was likely to mean for him the fate of Milan Gorkich or Sima Markovich.[1]

Tito and his subordinates set to work rebuilding the shattered organizational structure of the C.P.Y. and establishing Party unity. Party activities were increased in areas where Communist appeal was weak, particularly in Croatia and Slovenia, and new programs of political indoctrination were begun. Numerically, however, the Communist Party remained small, numbering about 12,000 in 1941.[2]

> But Tito and his lieutenants acquired in the years from 1937 to 1941 assets more valuable to Communists than popular support: they acquired the "cadres," a body of experienced and well trained followers who, for once, were not split into innumerable factions and groups. At every level of Yugoslav society and in every nationality the Party had a group of supporters which, in a crisis, could be counted upon to provide the elite of a revolutionary movement.[3]

It was also in 1937 that Josip Broz began to use the pseudonym "Tito" exclusively. Tito was a name common in his native Croatian district of Zagorje, and had no particular significance beyond concealing his real identity. It was only chance that made Tito the name under which Broz should become

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[1] Ibid., p. 20.

[2] Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Tito and Goliath (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1951), p. 40.

[3] Ulam, op. cit., p. 22

famous, for during his life, he has employed a myriad of aliases: Gligorijević, Zagorac, Jirechek, Walter, Mekas, Kostanjšek, Babić, and Karlsson among them.[1]

From 1937 to 1939 the C.P.Y. devoted much of its energy to opposing the ever-growing threat of Fascism. Then, in 1939, came the signing of the Russo-German Non-Aggression Pact. The Yugoslav Communists, imitating the astounding reversal executed by their Soviet comrades, became conspicuously silent. No less an authority than Tito himself says: "We accepted the pact like disciplined Communists, considering it necessary for the security of the Soviet Union, at that time the only Socialist state in the world."[2]

Even the coup d'état of March 27, 1941, led by General Simović and his Serbian officers, received no support from the C.P.Y. Shortly after the coup, Tito drew up the following order:

> 1. The Yugoslav Communist Party is now in a position to take an active part in overthrowing the present monarchial regime, and to this end will render assistance to all elements, regardless of their idealogical outlook and character, who are bent on the same purpose. . . .
>
> 2. Party members who are mobilized will have the following tasks to perform: first, to disorganize the resistance of the Yugoslav army by creating confusion among officers and men, so that defeat appears to be the result of the incompetence of the officer corps, whose authority will be destroyed once and for all; and, second, to collect all arms and equipment that may be thrown away in panic and convey them to safe hiding places for later use. . . .
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> 3. Render all necessary assistance to the Ustasha. . . and other separatist organizations, in so far as they

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[1] Dedijer, op. cit., passim.

[2] Ibid., p. 128

> contribute to the speedy overthrow of the [Simović] regime. Help should also be given to the Montenegrin separatists if they adopt an anti-Royalist line. . . .
>
> 4. Germany will speedily crush Yugoslav resistance and, with the help of Italy, will introduce the Ustasha regime in Croatia and . . . similar separatist regimes elsewhere. Steps must therefore be taken to infiltrate our own people into the new administrations for intelligence and other purposes.[1]

Not much nationalism in 1941!

The German blitkrieg hit Yugoslavia on April 6, 1941; still the Communists did nothing. Post-1948 protestations to the contrary, it was not until June 22, the invasion of Russia, that the Yugoslav Communists took up arms against the Axis invaders.[2]

> Until then they were ready to sabotage and obstruct and infiltrate the puppet regimes in Yugoslavia, just as they had done with every government in Yugoslavia since the country's inception, but after that they were ready to risk all and to give all in their unmeasured loyalty to Soviet Russia.[3]

The Axis onslaught crushed Yugoslavia and the country was partitioned among Germany and her satellites, Italy, Hungary, and Bulgaria. Croatia became an "independent state" under the Quisling government of Ante Pavelić, with a member of the Italian Royal House as king. Resistance was immediate. Regular army units, who had escaped to the mountains, and local armed bands began to harass the enemy.

After the attack on Russia, the Communists organized quickly, forming into armed units, and calling themselves

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[1]Stephen Clissold, Whirlwind: An Account of Marshall Tito's Rise to Power (New York: Philisophical Library, 1949), p. 27, quoted by White, op. cit., p. 34.

[2]See Ulam, op. cit., p. 26-27. [3]Ibid. p. 27.

Partisans. The dramatic story that followed is well-known. Tito, ignored by the Allied Powers, even Russia, welded together his Communist led "National Liberation Front," and conducted a vigorous resistance movement. Hundreds of thousands of Yugoslavs were attracted to his cause, and their gallant struggle against their conquerors won for them the support of the Allies. General Draža Mihailović, War Minister of the Yugoslav government-in-exile and leader of the Chetniks, a revival resistance army, was discredited. Tito and the Communists were on their way to power.[1]

In 1942 the Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ) was created as a front for the Partisan movement. Although the AVNOJ contained large

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[1] It is not the purpose of this study to discuss or analyze the arguments involved in the Tito-Mihailović controversy. However, an explanatory note is warranted.

Col. Draža Mihailović, a Yugoslav army officer, had supported the Simović coup in 1941 and, after the German invasion, was one of the first to organize an effective resistance movement. Mihailović, a Serb, led a purely Serbian movement, while Tito, through the Communist Party organization, led a movement encompassing every national and ethnic group and active in every part of the country. At the beginning of the war, the Allies supported Mihailović and his Chetniks. In 1943, however, aid was withdrawn due to recognition of Tito's Partisans as the major resistance force, and evidence, real or alleged, of Chetnik collaboration with the Axis.

Mihailović was captured by Partisan troops in March 1946. In July of that year, he was tried for high treason, found guilty, and condemned to death. On July 17, 1946, Draža Mihailović was shot; a tragic end for a man who defended his country.

For the Mihailović version of this controversy, see David Martin, Ally Betrayed: The Uncensored Story of Tito and Mihailovich (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1946); for the Communist version, Dedijer, op. cit. For a short dispassionate account of the Yugoslav resistance movements, see Seton-Watson, The East European Revolution, pp. 118-131.

numbers of non-Communists, in actuality, it was controlled by the C.P.Y.[1] One year later, the AVNOJ became the acting government in the territory held by the Partisans, and King Peter and the government-in-exile were advised not to return to Yugoslavia without the people.[2]

By the summer of 1944 most of the mountain and forest regions of Yugoslavia were in the possession of Tito's partisans. Serbia, Macedonia, Vojvodina, and most of Bosnia and Dalmatia were liberated in the autumn of 1944, and the north and west in May 1945.[3] As the Soviet army pushed west, Tito obtained a military-diplomatic concession that in later years was to have profound repercussions. The Soviet news agency Tass announced on September 29, 1944:

> A few days ago the Soviet High Command approached AVNOJ and the High Command of the Yugoslav People's Army of Liberation with a request to permit, in the interest of action against the German and Hungarian

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[1]See Ulam, op. cit., p. 33 f. Armstrong, op. cit., p. 22-23, states: "Though Tito was frankly a Communist, and though his men wore the red star on their caps, he depreciated too open talk about establishing an eventual Communist dictatorship. Even had he not seen the wisdom of this himself, he would have followed instructions to that effect from Stalin, who desired to avoid offending British and American democratic suseptibilities. In any event, Pavilich's fawning dependence on Hitler and Mussolini made it not too hard for patriots to persuade themselves that, by comparison, Tito's links with Moscow were unimportant. Moreover, there still lingered in Croatia, and even more in Montenegro and Serbia, strains of nineteenth-century Pan-Slavism, the effect of which was to surround Russia-- any Russia-- with a rosy aura and to make association with her, regardless of any social theories involved, more attractive than with any other Nation."

[2]Ulam, op. cit., p. 33

[3]Seton-Watson, The East European Revolution, p. 219.

> troops in Hungary, the temporary crossing of Soviet units into Yugoslav territory adjacent to the Hungarian border. The Soviet High Command let it be known at the same time that these units would be withdrawn from Yugoslavia after the fulfilment of their operative tasks. AVNOJ and the Yugoslav High Command expressed their readiness to accept the request of the Soviet High Command. The Soviet High Command on its side accepted the condition laid down by the Yugoslav side that the civil administration of AVNOJ in the Yugoslav districts entered by Soviet troops would remain untouched where it exists, and would be introduced where it does not yet exist.[1]

Thus the Soviet army found itself in the unique position of supporting the Partisan "liberator," rather than being the "liberator."

By the end of 1944 Belgrade was occupied by the Partisans. The AVNOJ was renamed the People's Front. Tito, as acting Prime Minister went through the motions of compromise with the government-in-exile, and in March 1945, even accepted some of its members into his government. As Tito stated: "We had to consent to this agreement because the Western Allies stubbornly insisted on it."[2] It was not for long. Other parties were not permitted to organize, opposition papers were suppressed, and just prior to the November election 253,000 persons were disfranchised.[3]

By the end of 1945 Yugoslavia was in the hands of the Communists. Behind the thin veil of the People's Front

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[1]Franz Borkenau, European Communism (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1953), p. 393. The author's italics.

[2]Tito, Political Report of the Central Committee, p. 119, quoted by Ulam, op. cit., p. 34.

[3]Seton-Watson, The East European Revolution, p. 221.

the C.P.Y. monopolized political power. Communist social and economic measures were introduced with a speed unmatched even in those countries under direct Soviet control.[1] Tito and Communism had triumphed.

[1] Ulam, op. cit., p. 34.

CHAPTER III

TITO VERSUS STALIN

June 28, 1948

On June 28, 1948 the Czech newspaper Rude Pravo carried a Cominform comunique announcing the expulsion of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia.[1] The western world was electrified. The unity of international Communism, Nikolai Bukharin's "spontane Realität," was shattered.[2]

Until that fateful day in 1948, most foreign observers had considered Yugoslavia as the most exemplary of the Soviet satellites.[3] No other satellite could boast a comparable war record; no other could boast a "popular" revolution and the establishment of a Communist government without outside help; and no other had attacked the post-war tasks of socialization and collectivization with more energy, more vigor, more revolutionary fervor than had Yugoslavia.

In retrospect, observers wondered why they had not been able to notice the impending crisis. After the break, it was concluded that cracks had begun to appear in the

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[1] Seton-Watson, The East European Revolution, p. 224.

[2] Hamilton Fish Armstrong states that in 1936 Bukharin told him the unity and harmony of Communist society were not theory, but "eine spontane Realität"-- "a spontanious fact." (Op. cit., p. X).

[3] Ibid., p. 88: Armstrong states that "alert" American Embassy officials in Belgrade had predicted what would happen two weeks before news of the break became public and had reported their suspicions to the State Department.

Communist monolith as early as 1946, or perhaps earlier. Published diplomatic correspondence was later to prove the validity of this deduction.

What had caused this incredible break within the Communist family? Had Russia planned it thus? Had Yugoslavia? If not, who had erred? And how had individualism and independence, which had long since ceased to exist in the Soviet Union, been able to survive and express itself in a satellite? Whatever the answers, "world Communism will never again be quite the same."[1]

Post-War Yugoslavia

Yugoslavia at the end of World War II occupied a position of primacy among the Soviet satellites. Tito, combining diplomatic maneuverings and military successes, had ended the war as a recognized ally of the U.S.S.R. and Yugoslavia thereby escaped Soviet occupation, the only east European state which can claim this distinction.[2] In April 1945, Tito visited Stalin in Moscow and signed a twenty year treaty of friendship and mutual assistance. Hamilton Fish Armstrong calls this treaty "the zenith of their collaboration."[3]

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[1] Ibid., p. 2.

[2] Soviet troops were in Czechoslovakia for only one year until November 1945. Although technically the Soviet Army there was not considered an occupation force, the difference was semantic rather than real.

[3] Armstrong, op. cit., p. 47.

Although the 1945 treaty may have been the "zenith," friendly relations between the two countries and Yugoslavia's pre-eminence in the Balkan area continued. In December 1946, a Pan-Slav Congress met in Belgrade. There, the Yugoslavs and Marshall Tito received "the highest consideration, second only to that of Russia and Marshall Stalin."[1] Even as late as 1947 and the creation of the Cominform, "the C.P.Y. was treated as the first among the Communist Parties outside the Soviet Union, despite the facts that from the point of view of population Yugoslavia is far behind Poland and that her economic importance is hardly equal to that of Czechoslovakia, Poland, or even Rumania."[2]

Unquestionably, Yugoslavia recognized her predominant position and perhaps exaggerated it. In May 1945, Partisan forces marched into Trieste and the Austrian provinces of Carinthia and Styria and only after a threat of Allied force did they withdraw. Tito obviously expected Russian support in this maneuver, but because Stalin apparently did not wish to chance open conflict with the West, it was not forthcoming.[3]

Tito's reaction was explosive. In a speech at Ljubljana, at the end of May 1945, he announced:

> It is said that this is a just war, and we have considered it such. However, we also seek a just end. We demand that everyone shall be master in his own house.

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[1]Hans Kohn, Pan-Slavism: Its History and Ideology (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1953), p. 235.

[2]Ulam, op. cit., pp. 70-71.

[3]White, op. cit., p. 140.

> We do not want to pay other people's bills. We do not want to be used as a bribe in international bargaining. We do not want to get involved in a policy of spheres of influence.[1]

Although Tito claims to have been directing his remarks only toward the Western Powers, it looked to Stalin as if Tito were publicly warning him.[2] On June 5, the Soviet Ambassador delivered the following ultimatum to the Yugoslav Foreign Office; "Tell Comrade Tito that if he should once again permit such an attack on the Soviet Union we shall be forced to reply with open criticism in the press and disavow him.[3]

The territorial claims advanced against Austria and Italy would have been made by any Yugoslav government. But the "violent and provocative manner" which the Yugoslav Communists adopted clearly indicates their self-recognition as the "advance guard of Communism.[4] It also brought their first threat of excommunication.[5]

The Communists continued to rule post-war Yugoslavia by means of their monolithic political organ, the People's Front. The Communist Party itself remained an elite organization composed of Partisan veterans of proved loyalty and discipline. Hesitant to risk lowering its standards, it

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[1]Armstrong, op. cit., p. 64.

[2]Ibid., pp. 64-65. [3]Ibid., p. 65.

[4]Ulam, op. cit., p. 85.

[5]Armstrong, op. cit., p. 65.

accepted new members slowly, letting the Popular Front handle mass recruiting.[1] Always in the background-- though not always inconspicuously so-- the C.P.Y. was content to simply pull the string of its political puppet.

Like all good Communists, Tito was a planner. Since, as an orthodox Marxist, he was firmly convinced that industrialization was a fundamental requisite of socialism, he planned for a vigorous program of industrial expansion. Not only would it be necessary to lay the foundation for heavy industry, but the production of long absent and much needed consumer goods and articles of daily consumption would have to be expanded. In the spring of 1946 a Law of the State Economic Plan was promulgated and the organizational basis was laid for long-term economic planning.

In April 1947, Yugoslavia launched the first Five Year Plan, the first satellite to undertake long-term economic planning.[2] In terms of initial capacity and ultimate aims the plan was exceptionally unrealistic.[3] Tito and his econ-

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[1] Seton-Watson, The East European Revolution, p. 312.

[2] Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria began Five Year Plans in 1949 and Hungary, in 1950. Also in 1950 Poland began a Six Year Plan.

[3] It would be impossible to evaluate the success or failure of the Yugoslav Five Year Plan: first, because the economic boycott imposed on Yugoslavia by the Cominform countries in 1948 necessitated a complete revision of the plan; and, second, because any information dealing with the Yugoslav economy (production capacity, and export and import figures) is a closely guarded secret. For a thorough discussion of the Yugoslav Five Year Plan, see Josef Korbel, Tito's Communism (Denver: University of Denver Press, 1951), pp. 207-231.

omic advisors apparently did not worry about Yugoslavia's lack of engineers, technicians, mechanics, skilled craftsmen, and administrative and managerial officials. In five years Yugoslavia was to be transformed from a backward, agricultural country to a modern, industrial state.

Stalin, however, did not approve of this ambitious plan. In the over-all Soviet scheme, Yugoslavia was to be the "breadbasket" of eastern Europe, a supplier of agricultural and industrial raw materials, while Czechoslovakia and Poland would be the producer of finished goods.[1] Tito was later to claim that Moscow hampered the fulfillment of the Five Year Plan by deception and delay in financial and trade matters.[2]

> Having built Socialism, the satellites would be more than ever subject to the laws of Socialist planning, and everything pointed towards these being interpreted towards one single end, the strengthening of Russia and the perpetuation of her predominance. The economy of each would produce for Russia first, and for itself-- to the degree that it was admitted to have requirements of its own-- second.[3]

The Soviet attitude toward the Five Year Plan was bound to have profound political ramifications. Tito had promised the Yugoslav people hydro-electricity, irrigation, factories, and highways, as well as consumer goods. But, if Russia would not supply the necessary heavy equipment and financial assistance, these plans would have to be postponed,

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[1]Anatole G. Mazour, Russia Past and Present (New York: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1951), p. 713.

[2]Armstrong, op. cit., p. 48.

[3]Ibid., p. 50.

if not abandoned.[1] It would be difficult to explain what had gone wrong.

Moreover, from Moscow came orders that the urban working class minority should hold the leading role in both Party and government and that the peasant majority should be restricted to a secondary influence. The same principle, if applied on the international level, would mean a loss of status and prestige for agrarian nations. Tito, as a representative of peasant Yugoslavia, therefore, would be much less influential in international Communist circles than the representatives of the more urban and industrialized countries.[2] Even for such a devoted disciple as Tito, this must have been difficult to accept.

The new Yugoslav government also found trouble in carrying out its vigorous program of collectivization.[3] The peasants, particularly in Serbia, rebelled at the idea of losing ancestral land. Overt resistance was, of course, out of the question, but dissatisfaction was widespread. Most of Tito's Partisan fighters had been peasants and this program was alienating some of his oldest and staunchest supporters.

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[1] Ibid., p. 51. [2] Ibid., p. 52-53.

[3] Ulam, op. cit., p. 120: ". . . There is ample ground to believe that the rulers of Yugoslavia, out of their Communist fanaticism and economic naivete, before 1948 pursued a faster pace in the collectivization of agriculture than any other country in the satellite area except, perhaps, Bulgaria, where the same characteristics motivated its Communist government."

In the spring of 1946 Tito had returned from one of his frequent trips to Moscow with the announcement that the Soviet Union was going to rearm the Yugoslav army with modern equipment, reorganize its structure, and supply it with military and technical advisors.

This offer on the part of the Soviet Union, although advantageous to the Yugoslavs, developed some rather disturbing features. It soon became apparent that the Soviet High Command, by deciding how the new army was to be equipped, would control its future character. Tito, however, was determined that the army should not lose its identity, and simply become a western arm of the Soviet military. Moreover, he did not want Soviet Intelligence to operate in the Yugoslav Army. And what was he to think when the Soviet "experts" suggested a small standing army, and advised against Yugoslavia building up a national armaments industry?[1]

The most immediate aim of post-war Yugoslavia's foreign policy was the foundation of a Balkan federation.[2] This federation was to be effected by the union of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia-- and, perhaps, at some future date Albania. Bulgaria and Yugoslavia both emerged from the war as Communist states. A union of these two nations would have several salutary effects: (1) economically, it definitely would be to their mutual advantage; (2) it would, in one way or another, dispose of the troublesome "Macedonian problem," which had long

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[1]See Ibid., p. 53. [2]Ulam, op. cit., p. 86

been a point of contention between the two countries; (3) it would be of tremendous propaganda value if these nations could bury historical animosities and merge under the Red banner, thereby proving "the magic efficacy of Communism in removing the evils of nationalism;"[1] (4) it would effectively help counterbalance any Anglo-American sympathy still lingering in the Balkan area; and (5) it would represent the fulfillment of an old pan-Slav ideal, the complete unification of the South Slavs.

"It appears probable that as early as 1944 and 1945, the idea of the federation had the enthusiastic approval of Moscow, if indeed the very initiative for it did not come from that quarter."[2] Tito claims, however, that the initiative for the proposed federation came from Yugoslavia in November, and indicates that Moscow gave the project only a lukewarm reception.[3]

The Yugoslav proposal involved first the incorporation of Pirin (Bulgarian) Macedonia into Yugoslav Macedonia, and then the acceptance of Bulgaria into the Yugoslav family as the seventh federal republic. Bulgaria, on the other hand, proposed a union based on parity-- an equal union of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, not simply equality among Yugoslavia's six constituent republics-- or simply, at first, a close alliance.[4] These and other issues prevented definite action for three years.

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[1] Ibid., p. 87. [2] Ibid., p. 87.

[3] See Dedijer, op. cit., p. 304. [4] Ulam, op. cit., p.91.

The first step toward the proposed union seemed to have taken place in August 1947. Prime Minister Georgi Dimitrov of Bulgaria conferred with Marshall Tito at Bled and it was announced that a treaty of friendship and a customs union were being considered.[1] Although publicly the fruits of simply a treaty of alliance, it "almost certainly contained unpublished clauses."[2] The following November, when Tito visited Sofia to sign the treaty, he said that Bulgaria and Yugoslavia were being bound so close together, "federation will be a mere formality."[3] Marshall Tito was guilty of undue optimism.

The Cominform

By 1943, when the headquarters of the Third International announced its dissolution in a gesture of courtesy toward Russia's wartime allies, it had already become obvious that post-war Communism would require a new and different type of international organization. The end of the war would witness, in all probability, the emergence of new Communist states and strong Communist parties. The Comintern, with its Moscow headquarters and obvious obedience to the Soviet Union, had been one of the main reasons for the distrust of Communism felt by even the most radical Socialists in the West.[4] Thus,

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[1] Armstrong, op. cit., p. 189.

[2] Ulam, op. cit., p. 93.

[3] Armstrong, op. cit., p. 189.

[4] Ulam, op. cit., p. 41.

such an organization, "owned and operated by Moscow," would prove a tremendous liability to the development of post-war Communism.

The "new" organization came into being in September 1947, when the representatives of the Communist parties of the U.S.S.R., Yugoslavia, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, France, and Italy met in Warsaw, Poland, and organized the Communist Information Bureau, the "Cominform." Its headquarters, ironically enough, were to be located in Belgrade. As its name indicates, the Cominform was founded, ostensibly at least, for the exchange of information, and not as a policy making body. In reality the creation of the Cominform was one of a series of steps taken to consolidate the position of the Soviet Union in eastern Europe.

The fate of Europe had been sealed in 1944-1945 when the two great Allied armies, the eastern and the western, met, and effectively divided the continent through the center. Although the West considered this division to be temporary and based on military expedience, the Russians regarded it as permanent, and immediately proceeded to incorporate eastern Europe into the Soviet orbit.[1]

From 1945 to 1947 the Russians did not seek to force the pace. Stalin felt that eastern Europe was his. He also took it for granted that his rule over that part of the continent would meet with American, if not British, acquiescence, and he did not wish to arouse western animosities by the too

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[1]John A. Lukacs, The Great Powers and Eastern Europe (New York: American Book Co., 1953), pp. 685-686.

rapid imposition of radical measures.[1] Edward Crankshaw says, "It cannot, indeed, be emphasized too much that Soviet actions in Eastern Europe which looked to us like calculated aggression at the time seemed the most natural and unremarkable behavior in the world to the Russians themselves. . . ."[2]

Nevertheless, by 1947 the United States had become alarmed. Not only had Russia succeeded in satellitizing nearly all of eastern Europe, but economic conditions in western Europe were such that they invited the spread of Communism to that area. The firm stand taken by the United States at the Moscow Conference, March 10 to April 24, 1947, and the Truman Doctrine, proclaimed in March 1947, showed definitely that America was determined to stop any future Communist expansion in Europe. The Truman Doctrine particularly, though confined to Greece and Turkey, must have had ominous undertones in Moscow. The offer of Marshall Aid the following June put the Soviet Union on the defensive. Even Poland and Czechoslovakia were eager to accept the offer, before they were remonstrated by Moscow and abandoned the idea.

Russia found a mixed reaction among the various Communist parties. This is a glaring example of the nationalism and independence that had crept into European Communism since the war. The Communists were not coordinated; they must close ranks. Thus, the Cominform was born.

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[1] Ibid., p. 686.

[2] Edward Crankshaw, Cracks in the Kremlin Wall (New York: The Viking Press, 1951), p. 181.

Why were only nine parties invited to take part in the founding ceremonies? It is impossible to justify the basis of selection on any systematic grounds. Rumania was represented, but not Albania; France was represented, but not Germany. Conspicuously absent were the European parties which were numerically weak and all non-European parties. It is difficult to believe, however, that an organization which controlled the Communist parties of Poland and Czechoslovakia would not control those of Germany and Austria, or that the Cominform had jurisdiction over France and Italy but not Belgium and Spain.[1] Perhaps it was not necessary to bring the smaller parties into the organization. As Adam Ulam states, "A Communist Party out of power is likely to be much more docile toward the Soviet Union than are those whose leaders are not only Communists but also leaders of their state and nation."[2] Thus it can be safely assumed the jurisdiction of the Cominform extended all over Europe, and perhaps to Britain and America.[3]

Still escaping Cominform control, however, were the Communist parties of Asia. Perhaps this can be explained by briefly examining a factional struggle in the Soviet Politburo. In 1947 there was an obvious split in the Politburo, the nature of which is not entirely clear. Andrei Zhdanov,

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[1]Borkenau, op. cit., p. 521.

[2]Ulam, op. cit., p. 49.

[3]Borkenau, op. cit., pp. 521-522.

apparently the leader of the faction opposing Stalin, and commonly regarded as the most influential Politburo member after Stalin himself, was "elected" Secretary-General of the Cominform. Authorities are in disagreement concerning the significance of this move. Hamilton Fish Armstrong states that Stalin probably had Zhdanov transferred to a field of activity where "he would have more limited contacts within the top Communist leadership."[1] Franz Borkenau, on the other hand, believes that Zhdanov's Cominform position indicated a Politburo victory for the Zhdanovites and a personal setback for Stalin.[2] Whatever the reason, Zhdanov still retained a great deal of authority and it is logical to assume that Stalin, suffering a serious challenge for his power, had limited his opponent's personal influence to a regional organization. And as was probably already apparent, it was those Communist parties not in the Cominform, the parties of Asia, which were to achieve notable success in the future.

The choice of Belgrade as the first seat of the Cominform has provided the basis for much speculation. Vladimir Dedijer claims that Stalin himself made the choice and indignantly explains that it was part of a plan to bind Yugoslavia "as tightly as possible to this organization in order to facilitate the blow that was to follow."[3] Armstrong

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[1]Armstrong, op. cit., p. 57.

[2]Borkenau, op. cit., pp. 518 ff.

[3]Dedijer, op. cit., p. 295.

reasons along similar lines:

> Perhaps Moscow may simply have realized, after plans for the Cominform had already been made, that if Belgrade became the headquarters the international Communist luminaries assembled there might help quiet the membership of the Jugoslav Party while the Tito clique was being purged.[1]

Franz Borkenau states that it was an "act of rebellion" undertaken by the Zhdanov faction against Stalin.[2]

None of these explanations seem to suffice. First of all, the choice of a satellite country as the seat of the Information Bureau was only natural, in order to avoid a Moscow label and to give the organization an international flavor. Secondly, Yugoslavia in 1947, for all her differences with the Soviet Union, was still Russia's leading understudy. What other country was more deserving of the honor? That Moscow may have had ulterior motives is not altogether improbable. Yugoslavia had already shown indications of independent thinking. Moscow may have felt that the Cominform office in Belgrade would provide a restraining influence on the boisterous Yugoslavs and would establish them more firmly in the Soviet orbit. To assume that the Russians were already planning Tito's excommunication would be accusing them of foresight and planning which would belie their later actions.

Zhdanov, clearly the dominating personality at the

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[1] Armstrong, op. cit., p. 67.

[2] Borkenau, op. cit., p. 521.

September meeting,[1] illustrated the glaring ambivalence of the new organization in a speech to the assembled delegates: "The Soviet Union," he declared, "unswervingly holds the position that political and economic relations between states must be built exclusively on the basis of equality of the Parties and mutual respect for their sovereign rights."[2] But then he continued with a complete authoritative directive about Cominform orientation and what its policies would have to be.[3]

The one discordant note of the conference was the speech of Edvard Kardelj, Yugoslavia's Foreign Minister. In contrast to other speakers, Kardelj was not full of praise for the Soviet Union, and taking certain license with fact, he bitterly attacked "those who slandered our Party . . . to the effect that the national liberation uprising developed fully only after Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union and not before."[4] Moreover, he did not once mention that Yugoslavia owed its liberation to the Soviet Union and the Red Army, an ingratiating tribute continually repeated by other countries.[5]

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[1]Accompanying Zhdanov to the conference, but occupying a secondary position, was Georgi Malenkov. One year later, with Zhdanov's death, Malenkov was to rise near the top of the Soviet hierarchy. Less than six years later, following the death of Stalin, he was to become the leader of the Soviet Union.

[2]For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy (Official Cominform publication), November 10, 1947, quoted in Ulam, op. cit., p. 50.

[3]Ulam, op. cit., p. 51.

[4]For a Lasting Peace, November 10, 1947, quoted in Ibid., p. 53.

[5]See Ulam, op. cit., pp. 52-53.

Nor did Milovan Djilas in his co-report for Yugoslavia choose to be overly enthusiastic about Russia's role in the Balkan liberation.[1]

Did this behavior on the part of the Yugoslav delegation foretell the coming schism? Appearances to the contrary, the answer is no. Mr. Adam Ulam in discussing the significance of Kardelj's attitude probably sums up the entire atmosphere of the conference.

> With our accumulated hindsight it is easy to see in Kardelj's departure from the etiquette required at a Communist meeting a sure portent of the crises which one year later was to rock the Cominform and cause the great break between Moscow and Belgrade. Yet such an explanation would be far-fetched. The Yugoslav's were probably indulging in a typical exhibition of their bad temper, occasioned by Moscow's attempt to set them at the same level as, say the Hungarian or Bulgarian Communists, who had received their freedom from the Red Army instead of working for it themselves. They were not as yet rebelling; they were sulking. The meeting, which to a casual observer would have appeared as a conference between equals with the Soviet Union playing the role of primus inter pares, must have been recognized by the initiated as the setting for a new stage in the development of the Communist-dominated governments of Eastern Europe--a stage which would be characterized more and more by stress on uniformity and subordination and less and less on the right of each government to follow its own route to socialism with only general guidance by Soviet policy and directives. The Yugoslav leaders had come to the conference with a profound irritation over certain aspects of Soviet policies. But their irritation was as yet not equivalent to defiance. It is necessary to draw this rather subtle distinction if the whole course of the Russo-Yugoslav dispute is to be understood.[2]

The Crisis

If the Cominform had been created with a view toward

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[1] Ibid., p. 54. [2] Ibid., p. 54.

curbing excessive independence and creating a European Communism totally subservient to the Soviet Union, its immediate effects were far from successful. Yugoslavia, long the symbol of independence among the "independent" People's Democracies of Eastern Europe, now continued as the symbol of independence among the Cominform's People's Democracy. Instead of losing prominence by subordination to the Cominform, the Land of the South Slavs took on a new, though not an enviable, prestige as the major spokesman against extending Soviet power and Russian nationalism.

It is true that Yugoslavia's new position or, perhaps, old position in new circumstances, was occasioned as much by wishful thinking on the part of other Communist leaders as by any overt acts on her own part. Tito, personally, was no better or no worse than before; but Tito, psychologically, had become the personification of all that Moscow was determined to destroy. His only apparent departure from Kremlin prescribed etiquette was an aggressive speech on September 27, 1947, in which he criticized the heads of other Communist Parties for timidity of leadership and even asserted that some were allowing "reactionary treacherous leadership" to remain in power in the People's Fronts.[1]

Relations between the two countries continued to be good, on the surface, but future political events were taking shape. The first development of significance came with the new year. In early January Prime Minister Dimitrov of Bulgaria

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[1]See Armstrong, op. cit., p. 58.

made an official visit to Rumania. In an interview on this occasion he was asked for a statement on the proposed Balkan and East European federations and whether other countries from these regions would be able to join.[1]

For a former Secretary-General of the Comintern, Dimitrov was not too considerate of the Soviet Union.[2] He replied in part:

> The question of a federation or confederation is premature for us. It is not on the agenda at present, and therefore this question was not a subject of the discussion at our conferences. When the question matures, and it must inevitably mature, then our peoples, the nations of people's democracy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary and Greece-- mind you, and Greece!-- will settle it. It is they who will decide what it will be-- a federation or confederation, and when and how it will be formed.[3]

On January 29, 1948, Pravda, undoubtedly expressing the attitude of the Kremlin, wrote in reply to real or imagined inquiries about the paper's publication of Dimitrov's statement:

> . . .[The publication of the statement] does not mean that the editors of Pravda agree with Comrade Dimitrov on the question of federation and customs union among the countries mentioned. On the contrary, the editors of Pravda consider that these countries require no question-

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[1]Dedijer, op. cit., p. 313.

[2]Ulam, op. cit., p. 94 n: "The speeches of Dimitrov lead to the theory . . . that the veteran Communist leader had attempted to form a federation of Eastern Communist states in order to free them from the influence of Moscow. Whatever the merit of such theorizing, it must be obvious that Dimitrov's speeches could not have been made, and publicized in the Soviet press, unless at the time when they were given they expressed the viewpoint of the U.S.S.R."

[3]Dedijer, op. cit., pp. 313-314.

> able and fabricated federation or confederation, or a customs union; what they require is the consolidation and defense of their independence and sovereignty by mobilizing and organizing internally their people's democratic forces, as was correctly stated in the well-known declaration of the nine Communist Parties.[1]

This short paragraph marked the complete collapse of the main objective of Yugoslavia's foreign policy. "Though it was Dimitrov who had to recant, the blow struck hardest at Tito and his Party.[2]

Early in 1948 the Soviet Politburo consulted certain selected members of other Cominform Parties about curbing the excessive independence of the C.P.Y. The need for caution had been decidedly minimized by the Communist coup d'état in Czechoslovakia in late February.[3] Any semblance of independence which Benes and Masaryk had been able to maintain was gone. It was improbable that any action against Tito and his group, regardless of how obvious the intention, could have any serious political consequence now that all of the satellite countries were firmly in the hands of the Communists.

According to Armstrong, many of the top Communists at this meeting were disturbed at the prospect of harsh action against Tito. One of the more prominent of these was Georgi Dimitrov, Prime Minister of Bulgaria, head of the Bulgarian Communist Party, and former Secretary-General of the old Comintern. Gheorgiu Gheorgiu-Dej, Vice-Premier of Rumania and Secretary-General of the Rumanian Workers Party

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[1]Ibid., p. 314 [2]Ulam, op. cit., p. 94.

[3]Armstrong, op. cit., p. 59.

(Communist), was another. Even Thorez of France and Togliatti of Italy favored only gradual efforts to bring Tito into line. Wladyslaw Gomulka, the Polish Communist and one of the founding fathers of the Cominform, was opposed to any disciplinary action against Tito and the C.P.Y.[1] "He knew that if the Kremlin had its way this would be the end of all independence, either Party or governmental, in satellite capitals."[2]

There is also evidence to indicate that perhaps no lesser figure than Zhdanov himself may have opposed harsh action against Tito. Aside from wishing to preserve and perpetuate the Cominform as he had made it and in which he exercised great influence, Zhdanov may have disagreed with Stalin's basic foreign policy aims in Eastern Europe and desired to see a Marxist community based on independent Communist parties and governments under Soviet guidance and direction, but not as mere tools of the Kremlin.[3] In any event, all opposition was overruled.

This half-hearted support for Tito was completely impersonal. The Yugoslav's bullyragging of other European Communists who had spent the war years in Moscow, their constant reminders that the C.P.Y. had achieved power by its own efforts, and their boasts about the rapid progress of

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[1]Armstrong, op. cit., p. 59. [2]Ibid.

[3]This is the argument put forth by Armstrong (op. cit., pp. 57 ff.) and can be substantiated to some extent. Borkenau (op. cit., pp. 518 ff.) agrees, but his thesis of Zhdanov's actual rebellion against Moscow seems to lack sufficient facts. However, Dedijer (op. cit., passim) represents Zhdanov as one of the arch criminals in the Soviet Conspiracy.

socialism in their country could hardly have endeared Tito and his colleagues to other Communist leaders. Nevertheless, there was an obvious community of interest. If Tito could be purged, none of them were safe. The instinct of self-preservation was strong; the method of self-preservation, however, was not readily discernible.

The mere fact that some of the Communist leaders had questioned the wisdom of Moscow's judgment became an urgent reason to enforce it.[1]

On March 18, 1948, the Yugoslav government was informed that the Soviet Union was immediately withdrawing all military advisors and instructors. The following day it was announced that all Soviet civilian specialists and technicians were also being called home. On March 20, Tito wrote to Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov inquiring about the recall, thus setting off a series of acrimonious charges by the Soviet Union and determined denials by the Yugoslavs.

The resulting correspondence[2] taking place between the two countries is unique for two reasons: (1) from their first communication on March 27, the Soviet attitude was one of scorn and open contempt, while the Yugoslavs were humble and sometimes apologetic-- but always firm; and (2) one can not help noticing the obvious propaganda element in the Soviet notes, an oddity in confidential diplomatic correspondence.

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[1]Armstrong, op. cit., p. 59.

[2]Translated in The Soviet Yugoslav Dispute: Test of Published Correspondence (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1948).

The tone of Tito's March 20 letter to Molotov indicates that he was clearly aware of the significance of the Soviet action. The reasons given for the withdrawal of Soviet personnel, the Yugoslav's lack of confidence in and unfriendly attitude toward the Russian advisors, were palpable inventions. Torn between incredulity and indignation, Tito wrote: "We are amazed, we cannot understand, and we are deeply hurt by not being informed of the true reason for this decision by the Government of the U.S.S.R."[1]

If Tito had any doubt about the Kremlin's intentions, it must have been removed upon receipt of the Soviet reply. In the note, dated March 27, the Soviets clearly presaged what was to come. Not content with more recent developments, the note referred to a statement made by Milovan Djilas in 1944 to the effect that "Soviet officers were, from a moral standpoint, inferior to the officers of the British army."[2] Although later both Tito and Djilas personally apologized to Stalin,[3] Moscow now considered it significant proof of Yugoslavia's anti-Soviet tendencies.

The communication further stated that the civilian mission had been withdrawn because of the refusal of Yugoslav government departments to give economic information to Soviet personnel without the approval of the state security organs. This meant that "the Yugoslav security organs controlled and supervised the Soviet representatives in Yugoslavia."[4] In

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[1] Ibid., p. 9.

[2] Ibid., p. 13.

[3] See ibid., p. 39.

[4] Ibid., p. 14.

addition, anti-Soviet rumors were being circulated by the Yugoslavs: this was not justifiable inter-Party criticism, but "slander."[1]

The letter continued with probably its most significant passage:

> Again, one might mention that, when he decided to declare war on the CPSU,[2] Trotsky also started with accusations of the CPSU as degenerate, as suffering from the limitations inherent in the narrow nationalism of great powers. Naturally he camouflaged all this with left slogans about world revolution. However, it is well known that Trotsky himself became degenerate, and when he was exposed, crossed over into the camp of the sworn enemies of the CPSU and the Soviet Union. We think that the political career of Trotsky is quite instructive.[3]

This was enough to strike terror in the hearts of the most hardened revolutionaries.

On April 13 the Yugoslavs again addressed themselves to Moscow, pleading,

> Our only desire is to eliminate every doubt and disbelief in the purity of the comradely and brotherly feeling of loyalty of our CC[4] of the C.P.Y. to the CPSU, to whom we will always remain thankful for the Marxist-Leninist doctrine which has led us until now and will lead us in the future . . . ."[5]

Furthermore, they requested that one or more members of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U. visit Yugoslavia and see for themselves the exemplary conduct of the C.P.Y.[6]

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[1] Ibid., p. 15.

[2] Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

[3] The Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute, p. 15. The author's italics.

[4] Central Committee.

[5] The Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute, p. 30

[6] Ibid.

The Soviet reply of May 4 was uncompromising and complained that the "Yugoslav Comrades do not accept criticism in a Marxist manner, but in a bourgeois manner. . . ."[1] It also stated, perhaps unwisely:

> Even though the French and Italian CPs [sic] have so far achieved less success than the CPY, this is not due to any special qualities of the CPY, but mainly because . . . the Soviet army came to the aid of the Yugoslav people, crushed the German invader, liberated Belgrade and in this way created the conditions which were necessary for the CPY to achieve power.[2]

Thus far, the conflict had been confined to the very top echelons of the respective Communist parties, but now the Soviets were saying that they had liberated Yugoslavia. This was a personal affront to the thousands of Yugoslavs who had taken part in the resistance movement, and this claim, undoubtedly, militated against Russia.[3] "For purely psychological reasons, if for nothing else, this is a charge which the C.P.Y. finds most useful to emphasize and discuss before the Yugoslav people."[4]

The Soviet letter of May 4 ended with a proposal that the Yugoslav question be discussed at the next meeting

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[1] Ibid., p. 31. [2] Ibid., p. 51.

[3] Mosha Piyade [Moša Pijade], About the Legend That the Yugoslav Uprising Owed Its Existence to Soviet Assistance (London, 1950), passim: Using the records of the Yugoslav People's Liberation Army, Pijade presents remarkably clear evidence to prove that the Soviet Union did not provide the Partisan army with any material or military assistance until 1944. Although he concedes that the Red Army helped in the liberation of Belgrade and other areas, Pijade is bitterly critical about the lack of Soviet help in 1942 and 1943.

Facts such as these were potent psychological weapons in the hands of the Yugoslav leaders.

[4] Ulam, op. cit., p. 73.

of the Cominform.[1] Tito, apparently realizing the outcome of such a discussion, notified Moscow that Yugoslav representatives would not attend.[2] On May 22 the Soviet Union notified Yugoslavia that by request of Hungary and Czechoslovakia the next Cominform meeting would take place the latter half of June.[3]

Catharsis

The Cominform Conference of June 1948 was not called to Belgrade, the seat of the organization, but to Bukharest. On June 28, the Cominform released the now famous communique containing the text of the resolution expelling the C.P.Y. from its ranks. The resolution ended with an appeal to the rank and file of the Yugoslav Party.

> The Yugoslav leaders evidently do not understand, or, probably, pretend they do not understand, that such a nationalist line can only lead to Yugoslavia's degeneration into an ordinary bourgeois republic, to the loss of its independence and to its transformation into a colony of the imperialist countries.
>
> The Information Bureau does not doubt that inside the Communist Party of Yugoslavia there are sufficient healthy elements, loyal to Marxism-Leninism, to the international traditions of the Yugoslav Communist Party and to the united socialist front.
>
> Their task is to compel their present leaders to recognize their mistakes openly and honestly and to rectify them; to break with nationalism, return to internationalism; and in every way to consolidate the united socialist front against imperialism.
>
> Should the present leaders of the Yugoslav Communist Party[4] prove incapable of doing this, their job is to re-

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[1] The Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute, p. 52.

[2] Ibid., p. 53. [3] Ibid., p. 56.

[4] Ibid., p. 62: Four leaders of the C.P.Y. were singled out personally: They were Tito, Djilas, Kardelj, and Ranković.

> place them and to advance a new internationalist leadership of the Party.
>
> The Information Bureau does not doubt that the Communist Party of Yugoslavia will be able to fulfil this honourable task.[1]

Thus, the Cominform destroyed the fiction that it was an organization respecting the sovereign rights of its member states, that it was no more, as was claimed previously, than a clearing house. Perhaps even more significant, some of the highest governmental officials of the Soviet Union, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, and Poland had openly and publicly appropriated the right to interfere in the affairs of a sovereign state, and had called for the overthrow of its existing government. The kid gloves were off; the Soviet Union was now openly attempting to bring Yugoslavia to her knees.

In the welter of confusion following the Cominform resolution it was frequently overlooked-- and with the passage of years frequently forgotten-- that the C.P.Y. refused to accept this decision as final, and still clung to the rather absurd hope that a reconciliation was possible. It was not that Tito and his subordinates were politically naive, but they must have been somewhat bewildered. Here was a group of men, fanatics who had spent most of their adult lives fighting for Communism, suddenly finding themselves at odds with all other Communists and completely bereft of friends. They could not turn to the West for, after all, they were

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[1] Ibid., pp. 69-70.

the sworn enemies of capitalism. Whatever struggle lay ahead, the Yugoslavs would have to face it as Communists. Their only hope, as they saw it, was reconciliation!

In July, a month after the break, the Yugoslavs held their Fifth Party Congress. Although attacking the Cominform resolution, they carefully avoided any direct criticism of Soviet leaders. They vigorously defended their own policies and attempted to prove that they deserved Soviet "commendation rather than condemnation."[1] The same month, the Yugoslav delegation to the Conference of Danubian States made a singularly ingratiating gesture. The Yugoslavs supported Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Vishinsky and assisted him in forcing through the Soviet Draft Convention. This convention placed long sections of the Danube under the control of the Soviet Union, much to the detriment of Yugoslavia and other European countries.[2]

As late as February 1949, the Yugoslav government applied for membership in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, an organization set up by the U.S.S.R. and the satellites, but the application was unceremoniously rejected.[3] Gradually, the Yugoslav leaders realized that reconciliation

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[1]M. S. Handler, "Communist Dogma and Jugoslav Practice," Foreign Affairs, XXX (April, 1952), 427-428.

[2]Ibid., p. 428

[3]See White Book On Aggressive Activities by the Governments of the U.S.S.R., Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and Albania Towards Yugoslavia (Beograd: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, 1951), pp. 283-285.

was impossible. The economic blockade imposed by the Soviet Union,[1] the treatment of Yugoslav diplomatic officials in Cominform countries,[2] the abrogation of treaties and agreements,[3] and other hostile acts forced Yugoslavia to turn, step by step, toward the West. Given time, the state propaganda organs could make it seem not too unnatural that a "Communist democracy" should associate itself with the "capitalists" and "imperialists."

Action and Reaction: A Summary

In the summer of 1947 the U.S.S.R. embarked on a drive to consolidate its position in Eastern Europe. American foreign policy had taken a sudden aggressive turn: first, the Truman Doctrine, designed to contain Communism; and then the Marshall Plan, complementing the containment policy and causing disturbing reactions in the Soviet satellites. The next American move could conceivably be aimed directly at wooing eastern Europe away from the Soviet Union. Moscow had to clearly and irrevocably delimit her sphere of influence.

In tightening his grip on eastern Europe, Stalin made a serious blunder. He alienated Yugoslavia, the effects of

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[1]See ibid., pp. 283-348.

[2]See ibid., pp. 457-471.

[3]See ibid., pp. 447-456.

which were to deal Soviet foreign policy a severe setback.[1] The original point of conflict in the Soviet-Yugoslav dispute was not ideological, but a practical, political issue; i.e., who would wield political power in Yugoslavia? The various charges of "deviationism" were so much window dressing. The Soviet Union was simply opposed to a Communist government and Communist Party controlled by a group of non-Russian Communists, in which the Russians were on the outside, so to speak, no matter how closely their directives were followed. The Soviet Union was not primarily concerned with what Tito and his followers were doing with their absolute power, it was only interested in replacing them with somebody completely subservient to Moscow.

Between 1944 and 1948 there was in Tito's position a large amount of dualism. He was a popular resistance hero and national leader and, at the same time, was, in effect, an agent of a foreign country. Tito was obviously disturbed about this latter position; he had expected to be treated as an equal. After it had become apparent that Stalin had no intention of granting him equality, the Yugoslav leader, somewhat disgruntled, settled down to his double role. This role could be fulfilled, however, only as long as there was a sufficient community, or coincidence, of interest between

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[1]This was only one of his blunders. Another was the establishment of the Berlin Blockade in June 1948, when the Soviets attempted to incorporate Berlin, the logical center of Eastern German, into the Soviet Zone. See Lukacs, op. cit., pp. 695 ff.

Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. When these interests came into conflict, one of Tito's twin roles would have to be discarded.

Even after the summer of 1947, when the Soviet Union decided to bring the satellite countries irrevocably under the Stalinist heel, Tito attempted to continue in his dual role. It was too late; the Kremlin considered this heresy.

Tito's position in the dispute is easy to perceive. When the dispute broke out early in 1948, the smallest price the Soviet Union would have exacted would have been a change in the top leadership of the C.P.Y. This change might have been gradual, shifting the former leaders to governmental and Party positions of decreasing importance, or a complete and immediate purge might have taken place. In either event, Tito and his lieutenants would have been deprived of both Party and governmental control. Thus, the choices before the Yugoslavs were only two: abdicate, and perhaps risk physical extinction, or fight. The choice was obvious-- fight!

In making this decision the leaders of the C.P.Y. were on fairly safe ground. Tito's entourage was young, they were fighters, and they had risen to position under his leadership. They were loyal to the regime and to their leader. Even against the tremendous power of the Soviet Union, they would stand with Tito and fight. Moreover, it was extremely unlikely that the Soviet Union would employ armed force, and perhaps precipitate World War III. If they did not, Yugoslavia could probably hold out.

The Soviet position is more difficult to understand. Certainly, when the dispute broke out, no single tenet of the Stalinist creed was as important as the principle of the infallibility of the Soviet Union. Stalin probably did not believe that Tito could, or would, hold out against the combined forces of the Cominform countries under Soviet leadership. But by May 1948, it had become obvious that Tito intended to try.

Why then did Stalin pursue his policy toward Yugoslavia? Here there is perhaps discernible an element of wishful thinking. If Tito and his lieutenants did not capitulate, possibly the Yugoslav rank and file would eliminate them when the Soviet Union's displeasure became known. This was highly unlikely, and Stalin must have known it. In the first place, Communism in Yugoslavia was the home-grown variety, not imported from Moscow. Secondly, an internal revolution by "Cominformists" would need strong leadership, which was sadly lacking.[1] And lastly, the Soviet belittling of the Yugoslav resistance movement, made the struggle one not of ideology but of national honor.

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[1]Ulam, op. cit., pp. 109-116 and p. 125: Although a few minor governmental figures sided with the Soviet Union in the dispute, only two key Party officials were purged. In the spring of 1948 Sreten Zhujović and Andrija Hebrang, both members of the Central Committee, were convicted of treason and sentenced to prison. Hebrang was probably plotting with the U.S.S.R. against Yugoslavia, but there is evidence that Zhujović was more of a Soviet dupe than a full partner in the attempt to displace Tito.

As Tito and Kardelj had written to Moscow on April 13, 1948: "No matter how much each of us loves the land of Socialism, the U.S.S.R., he can, in no case love his country less, which is also developing socialism-- in this concrete case the FPRY, for which so many thousands of its most progressive people fell."[1]

Thus, it must have been obvious to Stalin that the chances of failure were high. Would it not have been better to have retained an "independent" Yugoslavia than to shatter the illusion of international Communism's solidarity? The Kremlin's lights must have burned late while this question was being decided. The answer was-- No!

> Better to lose Yugoslavia, for a time at least, than create the impression that the Soviet Union was losing its uncompromising vigor and its passion for infallibility. Concede, on the other hand, and the charm was broken.[2]

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[1] The Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute, p. 19.

[2] Ulam, op. cit., p. 134.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

At this writing, some six years after the monumental Cominform schism, Yugoslavia has long since ceased to be a political novelty and has become an integral, though somewhat unique, part of the European political scene. In the greatest ideological battle of modern times, if not of all history, Yugoslavia stands alone, half way between East and West. Two important questions, however, remain unanswered. First, is there some innate element in modern Communism that made such a split inevitable? And second, what lessons and what conclusions can the West draw from the event?

Modern Communism, or Stalinism, is no longer the fervent, vigorous politico-economic ideology of thirty-five years ago. That continues only as an illusion useful for mass propaganda. Communism in Russia has become a system and an ideology of power. Thus, by its victories, Stalinism endangers the very system that it propagates. As in the case of Yugoslavia, the desire for power and control in Party and government won over Communist fanaticism. Moreover, as with any system of imperialism, Stalinism is bound to come into conflict with satellite nationalism.

Certainly Russia is aware of this internal danger. The "Titoist" purges which swept the satellite countries following the Yugoslav affair bear this out. Few of Tito's

old Cominform comrades were to remain. A list of the unfortunate purgees reads like a page from Who's Who in Satellite Communism: Gomulka, Klizko, and Bienkowski in Poland; Rajk, Szonyi, and Palffy in Hungary; Kostov, Pavlov, Stefanov, and Nechev in Bulgaria; Xoxe, Kerentyi, and Christo in Albania; Klementis and Novy in Czechoslovakia; Patrascanu in Hungary. Even Zhdanov and Dimitrov were soon to die, though apparently from natural causes.

The price paid in these periodic purges, which are still continuing, has been considerable. While making certain that no new "Tito" rises up within satellite Party ranks, the Soviets have destroyed some of their most capable and idealistic leaders. In the overall view, will it have been worth it?

While the West was celebrating its Cold War "victory" of the Berlin Air-lift and while it was still rejoicing over the rift in the Cominform, China fell to Communism. It is interesting to speculate on Stalin's reaction. Did sixteen million Yugoslavs mean as much as four hundred million Chinese? Did the psychological defeat in Germany offset the territorial victory in China? The answers are obvious.

The question has been raised, "Was all this part of a complex plan originating in Moscow?" Did Stalin sacrifice, so to speak, Yugoslavia, and did he divert attention to Berlin simply to gain an even more pretentious victory in Asia? Probably not. At least there is no concrete evidence to give

credence to such a thesis. But this event clearly points up the danger of momentary relaxation against Communism. The West should be continually on guard against purposeful or accidental diversions. It can prove very costly.

Today Yugoslavia is still Communist. After the rift with Moscow, Tito found that there was no kindred ideological concept to which he could turn. Consequently, a new interpretation had to evolve in order to rationalize Yugoslavia's position. It suddenly became apparent, to the Yugoslavs at least, that it was Stalin who was prostituting the teachings of the masters. In retrospect, they saw that this was no sudden change, but that the Soviet Union had been pursuing an "anti-Marxist" line for years. Thus, the ideological break, which was more apparent than real, followed the political break. In Yugoslavia it was no longer Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism; it was Marxism-Leninism-Titoism.

What then is Titoism? It is a grave and recurrent, but not necessarily fatal, disease of Stalinist Communism. Russia does recognize it; the West must recognize it. To be sure, the conditions for the development of Titoism cannot be automatically reproduced in any and every Communist country. However, the United States must watch for the symptoms and exploit the situation whenever it may occur. There are only two alternatives: one, a will-o'-the-wisp foreign policy based on wishful thinking and freedom balloons, would be dangerous; the other, outright war, would be disastrous.

What should the American attitude be toward Tito? Fundamentally, Yugoslavia is no better or no worse than Russia, though Yugoslavia temporarily lacks any expansionist tendencies. Still, Yugoslavia's holdout against the Soviet Union is of paramount importance to the West. Yugoslavia is not democratic, yet it is on the side of the "free world." This proves that there is room in the western camp for determined opposition to the so-called "rightest politics" and "capitalist economics" as typified by the United States. Paradoxically enough, this is important to the West. For as long as Titoism continues, it will provide a real and a psychological danger to Stalinist imperialism.

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